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Private Governance in International Affairs and the Erosion of Coordinated Market 
Economies in the European Union 
 
By 
 
Andreas Nölke 
 
Abstract 
 
The variety of capitalism-perspective is particularly well suited for an assessment of the 
broader political and economic effects of transnational private governance, given its 
focus on the interaction between the diverse economic institutions that are regulating 
capitalist formations. The core notion here is “institutional complementarity,” i.e. 
“referring to situations in which the functionality of an institutional form is conditioned 
by other institutions” (Martin Höpner). Thus, substantial changes in one institution may 
have wide-ranging consequences for other institutions and, correspondingly, for the 
model as a whole. Within the “variety of capitalism” (VoC)-perspective, the most 
sophisticated and most frequently used frame of reference is the distinction between 
“Liberal Market Economies/LME” and “Coordinated Market Economies/CME,” with the 
first “Anglo-Saxon” model usually illustrated with the case of the U.S. and the latter 
“Rhenish” model with Germany (Peter Hall and David Soskice). Currently, we can 
observe that institutions that are strongly interlinked with the LME model are being 
transplanted into CME type economies by means of transnational private governance, 
particularly within the European Union. Examples include accounting standards, rating 
agencies and competition policy enforcement by law firms. Together, these recent 
activities tend to strongly undermine the institutional complementarities inherent in 
CMEs. 
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Preface 
 
This paper was presented during a conference on “Germany in Global Economic 
Governance,” which took place at Cornell University on Feb. 22/23, 2008. It was 
organized by Stefan Schirm (Ruhr University of Bochum) and Hubert Zimmermann 
(Cornell). We would like to thank our sponsors, the DAAD (German Academic 
Exchange Service), the Department of Government, the University of Bochum, the Mario 
Einaudi Center for International Studies, the Institute for European Studies as well as 
Peter Katzenstein (Cornell), who served as commentator. 
 
Germany, still the third or fourth largest global economy, has been particularly active in 
proposing a tighter regulation of international financial markets.  We use Germany as an 
exemplary case of how medium-sized countries can shape global governance and how the 
political economy of countries with coordinated market economies conditions their global 
governance strategies as compared to so-called liberal market economies, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom.  With this focus, the project permits and initiates 
an overdue dialogue between the literatures on varieties of capitalism and on global 
governance, using global governance as the dependent variable. Another objective of the 
workshop was to address the dearth of country-specific case studies in research on global 
governance which often treats all states as essentially similar in their reaction to 
economic globalization. 
 
Contributors were asked to look at various areas of global governance (such as hedge 
fund regulation, IMF reform, Basel II, pharmaceutical regulation, corporate governance, 
transgovernmental standard-setting, etc). All papers identified several levels shaping the 
German position: the subnational, the European and the global level. The German 
government, with varying success, engaged in strategic forum-shopping among these 
levels. A further characteristic was close cooperation between state and non-state actors. 
Overall, the extent of Germany's capacity to shape global governance is surprisingly 
large.
    
  1    
Private Governance in International Affairs and the Erosion of Coordinated Market 
Economies in the European Union 
 
Introduction1 
During the last years we have learned a lot about the workings of private governance in 
international affairs (Cutler, Haulfer and Porter 1999, Hall and Biersteker 2002). Still, 
normative issues have not received much attention. When covered, the most important 
normative concerns were the implications of transnational private governance on national 
sovereignty and the related question of democratic accountability. How to evaluate the 
socio-economic consequences of private rulemaking at the transnational level remains a 
difficult task. Most theoretical frameworks within political science and international 
relations are too state-centric for these questions; they predominantly focus on public 
policies. Furthermore, the focus of concepts within International Relations is usually on 
the mode of governance (i.e. public versus private, national versus international), and 
much less on its content. (e.g. neo-liberal versus social-democratic). This paper tries to 
develop an alternative framework by linking the discussion on private governance in 
international affairs with the debate on the “varieties of Capitalism” and its distinction 
between the ideal types of “Liberal Market Economies/LME” (usually illustrated with 
examples form the US) and “Coordinated Market Economies/CME” (usually illustrated 
with examples from Germany) within comparative political economy (Hall and Soskice 
2001 a). The varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach is particularly well suited for as 
assessment of the economic consequences of an increasing prominence of transnational  
                                                 
1 This paper summarizes some research that I have conducted together with a number of collaborators 
within the Amsterdam Research Center for Corporate Governance Regulation (http://www.arccgor.nl/) 
during the last three years. It draws heavily on work together with James Perry, Arjan Vliegenthart and 
Angela Wigger whose inspiration is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks for generous funding are due to the 
Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) within the ‘Shifts in Governance’ program. For 
the original research proposal see Nölke 2004. 
Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the International Studies Association Workshop on 
“Accomplishments and Challenges in Research on Private Authority and Private Governance in 
International Affairs”, Chicago, February 27, 2007, at the Sixth Pan-European International Relations 
Conference, Turin, September 12-15, 2007 and at the workshop “Germany in Global Economic 
Governance” at Cornell University, Ithaca, February 22-23, 2008. I’m grateful to the participants for 
comments and suggestions, in particular to Claire Cutler, Hans Krause Hansen, Virginia Haufler, Robert 
Kaiser, Peter J. Katzenstein, Dieter Kerwer, Daniel Kinderman, Anna Leander, Chris May, Lena Partzsch, 
Tony Porter, Stefan Schirm, Or Raviv and Hubert Zimmermann. 
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private governance, given that it is deliberately based on a firm-centric conception of 
political economy, against the government-centric approaches that are dominating the 
field. 
 
The core argument of this paper is that many prominent cases of private governance in 
international affairs are strongly affiliated with the LME model, based on the powerful 
role of Anglo-Saxon coordination service firms. Given the increasing importance of these 
firms within international affairs, this development threatens to erode the comparative 
advantages of those economies that are associated with the CME model. The core notion 
here is “institutional complementarity,” i.e. “referring to situations in which the 
functionality of an institutional form is conditioned by other institutions” (Höpner 2005). 
Thus, substantial changes in one institution may have wide-ranging consequences for 
other institutions and, correspondingly, for the model as a whole. This would not only be 
to the disadvantage of Germany (and other “Rhenish” countries) and their socio-
economic systems that, inter alia, include a powerful rule for organized labour and fairly 
egalitarian systems of income distribution, but arguably also to the overall welfare of 
capitalist societies: 
 
To the extent that national or other institutional specifities serve as niches allowing firms and economies to 
develop competitive new products and processes, their disappearance must diminish the aggregate 
entrepreneurial creativity and vitality of capitalism as a system. It is furthermore highly unlikely that any 
one approach to running a capitalist economy will monopolize all the virtues – which would seem to offer 
good Popperian, or even Hayekian, reasons for seeking to preserve the innovative potential inherent in a 
healthy level of ‘socio-diversity’ within global capitalism (Crouch/Streeck 1997: 15). 
 
In order to further the argument of the ongoing erosion of CME-type economies by the 
transnational private governance of coordination service firms, the paper will first 
juxtapose the most important economic institutions within the LME-CME dichotomy 
(section 2). The core of the paper consists of three case studies on the influence of Anglo-
Saxon coordination service firms on core economic institutions within LME economies, 
namely those of rating agencies on bank-based corporate finance (section 3), accounting 
firms on stakeholder-oriented corporate governance (section 4) and law firms and the 
erosion of traditional forms of innovation transfer within competition policy (section 5). 
The conclusion places these developments into the broader context; the struggle over the 
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pre-dominant variety of capitalism within the European Union. Here is a crucial linkage 
between the mode and content of regulation. In this case, the mode of private 
governance has been a welcome option for the European Commission to overcome the 
opposition against more political attacks on coordinated capitalism that has been caused 
by public EU-regulation. Whereas public regulation has only led to uneasy compromises, 
as witnessed for the Takeover Directive, the European Works Council Directive or the 
European Company Statute Directive, private regulation has been more successful to 
further the LME model by deliberately choosing a less politicized, expert-based 
constellation. 
 
The Classification of Capitalisms According to the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’-theory: 
CME versus LME 
The most widely used and comprehensive version of the Varieties of Capitalism-model is 
still the one developed by Hall and Soskice (2001b). Although there are a number of 
alternatives (e.g. Whitley 1999, Coates 2000, Amable 2003, Schmidt 2003), most authors 
still prefer to depart from the juxtaposition of the ideal types of Coordinated Market 
Economies and Liberal Market Economies. Beside offering a rather balanced and 
comprehensive framework, one of the most important advantages of this typology is its 
parsimony (Jackson and Deeg 2006: 31-32): while the two ideal types clearly are unable 
to give full justice to the intricacies of, e.g., British, French or Italian capitalism, they still 
grasp the most important differences between “Anglo-Saxon” and “Rhenish” economies. 
 
The main theoretical task of the CME/LME juxtaposition is to explain the marked 
differences in the competitive advantages of advanced capitalist economies. These 
advantages are most easily demonstrated by focusing on the different types of innovation 
processes that are central to the two production systems (Hall and Soskice 2001b: 38-44). 
CMEs have a premium on incremental innovation which is particularly important for the 
production of capital goods such as machine tools, company equipments, consumer 
durables, engines, and specialized transport equipment, where “the problem is to maintain 
the high quality of an established product line, to devise incremental improvements to it 
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that attract consumer loyalty, and to secure continuous improvements in the production 
process in order to improve quality control and hold down costs” (ibid, p. 39). LMEs, in 
contrast, focus on radical innovation, which is important in fast-moving technology 
sectors (e.g. biotechnology or software development), and in the provision of complex 
system-based products and services (e.g. telecommunication or defense systems). 
 
The basic hypothesis of the Varieties of Capitalism approach is that the inherent 
institutional complementarities of the two different types of market economies are able to 
explain these specific innovation patterns. Furthermore, each element of the two ideal 
types has strong institutional complementarities with other elements of the same model, 
and differs clearly from the functional equivalent of the other model.  Usually, five 
interdependent elements can be highlighted (Hall/Soskice 2001b: 17-33, see also Jackson 
and Deeg 2006: 11-20), namely (1) the financial system, i.e. the primary means to raise 
investments, (2) corporate governance, i.e. the internal structure of the firm, (3) the 
pattern of industrial relations, (4) the education and training system and (5) the preferred 
mode for the transfer of innovations within the economy.  
 
(1) The primary means of raising capital for investment in the LME system are bonds and 
equities to be issued on international capital markets. In CMEs, domestic bank lending 
plays a much bigger role, together with retained earnings. The two different modes of 
corporate finance clearly differ regarding the importance of current returns and of 
publicly available information. Companies in LME economies are strongly dependent on 
publicly available information and on current earnings for their terms of investments. 
Dispersed and rather fluid investors need this information in order to value the quality of 
bonds and shares. In CME, the importance of balance sheet criteria is less prominent, 
since investors have alternative sources of information, either as owners (family 
enterprises or concentrated capital) or based on long-term business (banking) 
relationships, together with diverse channels for reputational monitoring such as business 
associations. 
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(2) Correspondingly, the corporate governance systems in the two models differ starkly. 
The LME model focuses on outsider control by dispersed owners, based on active 
markets for corporate control (mergers and acquisitions, including hostile takeovers). 
Managers enjoy a considerable freedom of maneuver, being controlled via incentives that 
are strongly geared towards share prices, e.g. via share options. The CME model, in 
contrast, has rather strong disincentives for hostile takeovers, and is primarily based on 
the insider control by major shareholders (blockholders). Managers have to find the 
consensus of their supervisory boards for major decisions and therefore have to involve 
blockholders and representatives of workers.  
 
(3) Generally, the relationship between business and labor is far more consensual 
within the CME model, based on a corporatist system of industrial relations including 
industry-level wage bargaining and powerful company-level works councils (or even 
worker representation in supervisory boards as in the German Mitbestimmung). This is a 
necessity for production strategies that are based on continuous improvements in product 
lines and production processes, based on highly skilled labor. Management needs 
motivated labor to keep productivity high, whereas labor needs protection against lay-offs 
to invest into company-specific skills. The LME pattern of industrial relations, in 
contrast, relies heavily on the market as coordinating mechanism. Management has full 
autonomy to hire and fire based on highly fluid labor markets. Staff, in return, has few 
incentives to invest in company-specific skills and instead focus on general skills 
transferable across firms. 
 
(4) Education and training systems in CMEs are geared towards the provision of 
skilled workers with highly industrial or company-specific skills. Correspondingly, 
business invests strongly into the human capital of its staff, e.g. based on a 
comprehensive apprenticeship system and a strong focus on vocational training. Powerful 
employer associations prevent free riding of individual firms on the training effort of 
others. Given the fluidity of labor markets in LME, in contrast, there are only very 
limited incentives to invest in industry- or company specific skills. Companies would not 
be able to benefit from their investments, because workers might be lured away from 
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competitors, whereas workers depend on acquiring skills that can be used in many 
different locations. Correspondingly, the education system is geared towards the 
provision of general skills. 
 
(5) All capitalist varieties rely on the speedy transfer of innovations throughout the 
economy. Within Liberal Market Economies, this transfer most frequently takes place by 
hiring qualified staff from other companies, or buying the whole company that has made 
this particular innovation. Both options are supported by a rather fluid labor law and 
active markets for corporate control. In Coordinated Market Economies, this option is not 
readily available, given long-term labor contracts and protection against hostile take-
overs. Instead, innovations are transferred by a host of inter-company relationships, 
including business associations or joint ventures, and frequently supported by public 
funds. This specific innovation system complements very well with sector-wide training 
schemes that focus on industry-specific skills. 
 
In sum, the two models differ in the basic mechanisms for the solution of coordination 
problems within national economies. In Liberal Market Economies, the most important 
form of coordination are competitive market arrangements and formal contracts. In 
Coordinated Market Economies, non-market forms of coordination such as inter-firm 
networks and national or sectoral associations play a crucial role (Hall and Soskice 
2001b: 8, 33-36).  
 
While LME and CME-type economies can safely co-exist – and this co-existence may 
even be considered as healthy – we witness an increasing number of clashes between 
some of the underlying institutions within the European Union. More and more, these 
economic issue areas are being regulated by the common institutional framework of the 
Single Market. Only one of the five core institutional areas outlined above so far has 
largely remained unaffected of unifying EU regulations, i.e. the education and training 
systems. Although the recent Bologna process has lead to considerable EU inroads in the 
field of higher education, education and training systems have clearly remained a core 
prerogative of the Member States of the Union. A second institutional area has witnessed 
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a major clash between the economic systems of the Member States, i.e. the relationship 
between capital and labour. Here, the Commission tried to introduce regulations that 
threatened to undermine core institutions of CME economies, such as the German system 
of co-determination. However, massive political opposition by the affected governments 
has lead to a number of uneasy compromises that leave the national institutions largely 
intact, such as the European Works Council Directive or the European Company Statute 
Directive (Cernat 2004). In the three remaining domains, however, we witness the 
emergence of EU regulations that are clearly favouring the LME model. In case of 
corporate finance, Anglo-Saxon rating agencies have become an important part of EU 
banking regulation. The provision of company information for listed firms, a crucial 
element of corporate governance regulation within the EU, is now regulated by 
International Accounting Standards that are strongly influenced by the Big Four 
accounting companies and LME practices. Finally, the regulation of EU competition 
policy, a crucial regulatory framework for the transfer of innovations between 
companies has recently witnessed a fundamental change that has very much empowered 
Anglo-Saxon law companies and can be interpreted as a shift towards a LME framework.  
 
In the following three sections, I will demonstrate for each of these three types of 
coordination service firms how they are embedded within the LME model, how their 
authority recently has been extended (most notably by the European Union) to affect 
CME-type economies, and how they might contribute to the erosion of core institutions 
within the latter.  
 
Rating Agencies and the Erosion of Bank-based Corporate Finance2 
The authority of rating agencies is a product, and a core element, of an ongoing process of 
the disintermediation of finance that diminishes the role of commercial banks in the 
provision of capital (cf. King and Sinclair 2001: 5-8). LME and CME economies differ 
heavily regarding the degree of financial disintermediation – whereas this process is very 
much advanced in LMEs, within CMEs banks still retain a very prominent role for company 
                                                 
2 This section of the paper draws on Nölke and Perry 2007. 
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finance. Banks traditionally function as financial intermediaries in that they bring together 
the users and suppliers of financial resources. Alternatively, suppliers and users can also 
come to an agreement without the intermediation of banks (i.e. via capital markets), thereby 
avoiding the overhead costs involved. However, this process of disintermediation creates an 
information problem for investors, since they have to carry the risk of default repayments 
themselves. This is when rating agencies come in, because they take over the task of 
collecting dispersed information on the financial situation of borrowers and condensing it 
into a single measure, a standardised metric (a “rating”), which is then used as a benchmark 
for other market actors.  
 
Although there has been intensified competition and an increasing number of players in 
the credit rating sector since the 1990s, two major Anglo-Saxon agencies – Moody’s 
Investor Service (Moody’s) and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) – continue to dominate the 
market. Other agencies occupy niche markets, such as Fitch Ratings for municipal and 
financial institutions. The dominant role of Moody’s and S&P is not limited to the US, 
and it is their transnational authority over European and Asian market actors that has 
caused the most controversy (King and Sinclair 2001: 12). This controversy has been 
intensified by the Basle II capital adequacy proposals which mandate specific risk metrics 
which are to be provided by the leading rating agencies (cf. King and Sinclair 2001: 17-
25). The justification for these proposals is that banking insolvencies have frequently 
been shown not to be limited to a bank’s country of origin, but rather to have spilled-over 
to impact the financial systems of other countries. Still, given the level of competition in 
the banking sector and the mercantilist behaviour of many governments, banks have long 
had a strong incentive to take greater risks than might be considered optimal. While the 
first Capital Adequacy Accord in 1988 (Basle I) addressed some of these issues, a second 
accord (Basle II) currently is in its final round of ratification and has already been 
adopted by the European Union. Rating agencies play a core role in Basle II, because less 
sophisticated banks are obliged to calculate the amount of capital to be held against the 
risk of credit default based on external ratings. Private authority here becomes enmeshed 
in a public-private system of multi-level governance.  
 
   9 
Credit rating agencies exercise their authority in two ways (cf. King and Sinclair 2001: 
4): First and foremost, they shape the behaviour of market participants by limiting their 
thinking to a range of legitimate possibilities. Secondly, they can occasionally exercise an 
explicit veto over certain options by using a ratings downgrade. Rating agencies have 
received most attention for their evaluation of public institutions, because this assessment 
forms one of the most obvious cases transnational private authority has a direct impact on 
public actors (cf. Hillebrand 2001, Sinclair 2003: 151-155), although the principal task of 
rating agencies is to assess the “quality of other companies” debts. It is here that rating 
agencies exercise their authority over other private actors, since most companies cannot 
afford a low ranking and will therefore consider changing their behaviour to suit the 
preferences of a rating agency. The authority of rating agencies over the basic 
organization of capitalist economies should therefore not be underestimated. Even if a 
company that is issuing a bond does not agree with a particular assessment, it has to take 
account of other market actors who will be acting upon that particular rating (King and 
Sinclair 2001:11). Given the public character of rating up/downgrades, the impact of 
these agencies is far more infrastructural than the confidential assessment of banks in a 
system of intermediated finance as typical for CME economies. Correspondingly, rating 
agencies can be considered a core element of the LME model of ‘financialised 
capitalism’ in which the owners of liquid capital and their investment analysts occupy a 
powerful position (Sinclair 1999: 158). 
 
Insofar as the epistemic authority of rating agencies favours the LME system of 
disintermediated finance, it is not politically neutral, but rather actively favours a specific 
socio-economic model which is very much in line with the short-term investment horizon of 
the Anglo-Saxon approach (Sinclair 1994: 149). Third-party enforcement of credit rating has 
a long history in the US and some other Western countries (cf. Kerwer 2001, King and 
Sinclair 2001: 14-17), but has now gone global. These most recent developments have not 
only been criticized due to the practical problems involved, but also because they may 
further undermine the Rhenish model, in this case especially the financing structure of many 
“Mittelstand” companies, one of the backbones of Rhenish capitalism (and of CME-type 
economies in more general). Currently, German small and medium sized business feel this 
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threat very strongly because of the limited availability of internally generated funds and their 
strong reliance on long-term loan financing for investment. Basle II and the increasing role 
of rating agencies will make this financing model even more difficult since highly indebted 
companies will face a steep increase in credit costs due to their ‘problematic’ risk profile 
under Basle II. In effect, many of these companies are being forced to mobilize funding by 
going public or selling themselves to private equity funds, often referred to by critics in 
especially continental Europe as locusts. This may, in turn, lead to the familiar “… pressures 
of ‘short-termism’ that plague American and British companies – pressure from 
shareholders to maximize dividends by concentrating on quarterly results and short-range 
return on investment variables” (Sally 1995: 69), and to a more conflictive relationship with 
the representatives of labour. An increasing role of rating agencies, therefore, may threaten 
the very basis of the Rhenish capitalist model because its elements are highly interdependent 
and may not be easily transferred and exchanged. 
 
Accounting Firms and the Erosion of Stakeholder-oriented Corporate Governance 3 
As coordination service firms, the accountants occupy an especially privileged position 
since they alone have the authority and legitimacy to validate the accounting information 
provided by corporations in their financial statements. Without such validation (auditing), 
the corporations cannot fulfil their statutory obligation to publish annual financial 
statements. Accounting information is an essential element of corporate governance around 
which production and distribution are organised in a market-based economy. The measures 
of profit, wealth and value provided in companies’ annual financial statements are the 
primary means by which society is able to compare the efficiency of different production 
techniques. This is true in both the public and private sector. In the former, national 
government statistics on economic growth, and also on the contribution of various industrial 
sectors to that growth, draw substantially on accounting numbers produced at the firm-level. 
Such statistics inform policy decisions not only in corporate governance, but also in other 
policy arenas such as education and trade. In the private sector investors allocate financial 
resources on the basis of accounting information which they receive both directly and via 
                                                 
3 This section of the paper draws on Perry and Nölke 2006 as well as Nölke and Perry 2007. 
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intermediaries who process and analyse the data for specific purposes. Among these 
intermediaries are not only the specialised financial news media, but also the rating agencies 
discussed in the previous section that rely on financial statements for comparable data 
describing the performance and solvency of the companies whose creditworthiness they are 
assessing.  
 
Important for the authority of accounting companies as coordination service firms is the 
widespread adoption of international accounting standards, as developed by the private 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Traditionally, accounting standards were 
developed on the national level, under the supervision of national governments. However, 
international economic integration and the disintermediation of finance have led to 
increasing demands for the harmonization of national standards. The assessment of the 
quality of stocks traded on international capital markets relies on accounting: international 
financial investors not only need transparent company accounts in order to make their 
resource allocations on a sound basis, but also standardisation of such information in order 
to compare their investment options in different countries without major difficulties. In the 
absence of international harmonisation of accounting standards, financial investors have 
shown a clear preference for the shares of firms audited by the global accounting firms, i.e. 
the Big Four (Strange 1996: 137). In the system of bank-intermediated finance, prevalent 
within LME-type economies, internationally harmonized accounting standards were less 
important, partially because of the domestic focus of many banks, but also because banks 
frequently had alternative ways of assessing the financial situation of their major clients due 
to their insider status (e.g. as blockholders). 
 
Internationally harmonized accounting standards are also important for the legitimacy 
resource base of the whole profession, because it increasingly becomes obvious that 
different national standards lead to dramatically different results for the same company, 
thereby threatening to call the reliability of accounting information into question, and 
with it the authority of the profession. Following failed intergovernmental efforts to 
harmonise EU accounting standards, the European Commission decided to adopt IASB 
standards for all exchange-listed corporations in the EU from 2005, taking the total 
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coverage to ninety-two countries (Tweedie and Seidenstein 2005). The United States has 
not adopted IASB standards, instead retaining those set by the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB). However, the IASB and FASB have been engaged in a long-
term convergence project since 2002 (the “Norwalk Agreement”) and the two 
organisations are now developing many standards jointly by default.  
 
The ongoing process of international accounting harmonization can be seen to have 
strengthened the position of the Big Four accounting firms in several respects. First it has 
reduced the threat that divergent national standards and the corresponding differences in 
company earnings posed to the authority of their main product (audited financial 
statements). Second, harmonisation also gives the Big Four even greater scale advantages 
in capturing national markets that were hitherto regulated by local standards. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Big Four are the major source of funding for the 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, a non-profit Delaware 
corporation which is the parent body of the IASB, and which funds and directs the work 
schedule of the standard setter. The Big Four accounting firms also occupy key positions 
on the IASB’s committees and working groups, as do many financial-sector actors, which 
may go some way to explaining the content as well as the form of regulation (Perry and 
Nölke 2006). 
 
The development of powerful transnational private authority in the form of accounting firms 
was already highlighted by Susan Strange in her seminal study on the “Retreat of the State” 
(1996, chapter 10). Strange focused on the extreme concentration of the market for 
accounting services, where the biggest six firms (referred to as the “Big Six”) had market 
shares of more than 95 per cent in the most important national markets, thereby giving them 
considerable structural power. In the meantime, concentration within the sector has 
progressed even further, with the Big Six have becoming the Big Four 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloite & Touche, and Ernst & Young). A study by the 
US General Accounting Office (2003, cited by Porter 2005: 6) revealed that these four firms 
audit over 78 percent of US public companies, virtually 100 percent of major listed 
companies in the UK, over 80 percent in Japan and 90 percent in the Netherlands. This 
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heavy concentration within the accounting industry is, inter alia, being supported by the 
ongoing process for the development of international accounting standards, as highlighted 
above. At the same time, the powerful role of the Big Four together with the current 
harmonization of international accounting standards intensify the structural impact of this 
type of coordination service firms.  
 
Central to the IASB’s new standards is the move from historic cost to fair value 
accounting (Nölke and Perry 2006). Historic cost accounting values assets at the cost of 
acquisition whereas fair value accounting uses current market prices (if no such market 
exists, a model is used to arrive at a simulated market price). The move from historic cost 
to fair value reduces the discretion of management in valuing assets, especially for assets 
with active markets. It also compresses the future into the present in a manner which is 
both volatile and which changes the reference point for understanding both the value, and 
the workings, of a company. An asset is valued by buyers and sellers based on the present 
value of the future expected profits which will arise from owning it. With historic-cost 
accounting, this process impacts the asset’s accounting value only once, when it is 
acquired. The result is that the asset is thereafter seen more for its productive capacity, 
and less for its acquisition/disposal value. Under fair value-accounting the re-evaluation 
of an asset’s worth is an almost continuous process. As such, the current use of the asset 
has to be regularly justified in terms of its current market value. Fair value accounting 
therefore gives external forces (i.e. influential financial market actors) more leverage 
with which to set the parameters for economic decision making within the firm, a practice 
which is in line with the corporate governance relationship between shareholders and 
managers in the LME variety of capitalism. 
 
Accounting standards are an integral foundation of a particular variety of capitalism. 
Thus, the rather conservative, creditor-oriented accounting standards in Germany (the 
Handelsgesetzbuch/HGB) complement the strong role of the German banks during the 
development of the CME variety of capitalism in which the HGB was designed. For 
example, the German accounting standards which enabled the building substantial 
‘hidden’ reserves by German companies should be seen as an expression of the priority 
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German banks gave to ensuring the safety of their long-term lending to enterprises. In 
contrast, IASB financial statements now employ so-called fair value accounting (the 
IASB’s preferred measurement technique for new accounting standards), giving 
shareholders the wherewithal to demand that every corporate asset is put to its most 
profitable use, as judged by market benchmarks (Barlev and Haddad 2003). In defining 
what constitutes a profitable use, shareholders are likely to adopt a much shorter-term 
perspective than managers so IASB standards can be expected to make conservative 
(Rhenish) financial planning rather more difficult, and thereby serve to discourage the 
longer-term business strategies which depend upon it. 
 
More trouble for the Rhenish model has recently surfaced in the context of the 
International Accounting Standards Board’s IAS32. By reclassifying the internal capital 
(Eigenkapital) as borrowed capital, many small- and medium scale enterprises become 
heavily indebted (in accounting terms). Together with Basle II, this could strongly 
increase their credit risk premium (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28 November 
2005, p.20) 
 
It should be stressed however that accounting standards are not the root cause of such 
changes and pressures – rather they are a complimentary factor alongside others such as 
the deregulation of the financial sector, and the corresponding rise of shareholder value 
from a management consultant’s tool to a corporate governance paradigm. Nevertheless, 
IASB accounting standards are playing a key role in institutionalising changes in the 
structure of capitalism. As in the case of credit rating, regulation based on the LME 
variety of capitalism and on a powerful role for Anglo-Saxon coordination service firms 
is contributing to an erosion of the CME variety. It is probably the realisation of this fact, 
which recently led to the foundation by major German companies of a German 
committee for accounting standards (Deutsches Rechnungslegungs Standards Committee/ 
DRSC), with the specific purpose of wielding greater influence in the IASB’s policy 
network. So far the DRSC has not been very successful, as evidenced by its 
comprehensive reorganization after only a short period of operation.  
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Law Firms, Competition Policy and the Erosion of Traditional Forms of Innovation 
Transfer4 
In order to understand the implications of the recent fundamental shift within EU 
competition policy for the variety of capitalisms within the European Union, we first 
have to clarify the different principles and enforcement practices underpinning 
competition policy within the CME and LME models, as illustrated with examples from 
Germany and the US. While the traditional EU system of competition policy was very 
much in line with CME (German) institutions, the recent shift has introduced major 
elements of the LME (US) model and may threaten traditional forms of innovation 
transfer within CME-type economies. A crucial ingredient of this recent shift is the 
empowerment of Anglo-Saxon law firms that play an important role within the private 
enforcement of competition policy within the US. 
 
Underlying the spirit of the CME model is the perception that capitalism needs to be 
organized and economic power controlled (Albert, 1993: 117-9; Streeck, 1997: 37). 
Markets are not perfectly self-regulatory, but jeopardized by “market failures,” such as 
the abuse of excessive market power, restrictive business practices and collusive 
agreements between corporate actors. Public market intervention in the form of 
competition control is conceived as necessary for the preservation of an open and free 
economic life, and in a wider sense also for pluralistic democracy. Hence, the state 
should provide for a pro-active and strong institutional framework that safeguards market 
players from the anarchy of free markets, creating a “thoroughly and continuously 
policed competition order” (Budzinski, 2003: 15). Rather than privileging certain 
interests above others, the competitive order should serve the economic wellbeing of a 
broad variety of socio-economic constituencies. Some forms of inter-firm collaboration 
may be acceptable (or even desirable), in particular if these serve the diffusion of 
technology within the economy (Hall and Soskice, 2001b: 26). This multi-goal and long-
term orientation provides a philosophical framework for a balanced interventionist 
strategy in the administration of anti-competitive conduct, representing a regulatory 
analogue of the more generic “Rhenish model” of social market economy.  
                                                 
4 This section of the paper draws on Wigger and Nölke 2007. 
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Although the overall influence of German ordo-liberal scholars in other economic 
regulatory policies has waned since the 1960s, it continued to have a remarkable 
stronghold in EU competition policy (cf. Budzinski, 2003; Hölscher and Stephan, 2004). 
The ordo-liberal idea of public market intervention is reflected in the fact that EU 
competition laws were designed to serve primarily the long-term goal of the European 
integration project, also including wider socio-economic policy purposes, such as the 
occasional alleviation of employment problems of certain sectors or regions and the 
restructuring of “sick” industries (Jarman-Williams, 2001). SMEs received special 
protection from fierce competition through subsidized loans, R&D support and financial 
guarantees (Motta, 2004: 16).  
 
Conversely, the maxims of the Chicago School have had a strong influence on the US 
antitrust system of the last decades, the archetypical example of an LME-type economy. 
According to this paradigm’s central tenet, public market intervention is intrinsically at 
odds with a free market ideology. As a monetarist response to Keynesianism, Chicago 
scholars propagated the deregulation and liberalization of markets (Budzinski, 2003: 9). 
Structural interventions should be the exception, or then be restricted to the minimum 
necessary, since markets largely regulate themselves. The ultimate determining factor for 
assessing anticompetitive conduct should be consumer welfare maximization, 
underpinned by rigorous economic modeling based on neo-classical price theory – a 
cornerstone of the Chicago School (Fox, 1997: 340). The single goal orientation with 
regard to mere price reductions for consumers is reverberated in a short-term view on 
economic efficiency, another important yardstick of the Chicago theorem. Following 
from a commitment to “survival of the fittest” logic, it propagates a permissive attitude 
towards “size” as long as prices remain competitive and “economics of scale” can be 
achieved. Consequently, not the concentration of market power as such, but collusive 
agreements with clear negative effects on consumer welfare, cartels and other restrictive 
business practices should constitute the focal point of competition control. Long-term 
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economic concerns, such as the diffusion of technological innovation through inter-firm 
collaboration, do not play an important role in the LME variety of competition control 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001b: 31). 
 
Not only the basic guidelines governing competition law differ considerably between the 
CME and LME models (as outlined above), but also the enforcement practices. Again, 
these differences can best be understood in the different institutional arrangements of the 
variety of capitalisms. The distinction between LME versus the CMEway of enforcement 
follows in broad lines the contours of the classification of common versus civil law made 
by scholars of comparative law.    
 
The common law tradition underpins the institutional setup of Anglo-Saxon competition 
authorities (cf. Gerber, 1998). Competition law enforcement is a case-orientated endeavor 
in which courts constitute the ultimate resort of stopping anticompetitive conduct. In 
what is generally referred to as the court model or the “bifurcated judicial model” (cf. 
Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2002), the antitrust agency is merely equipped with 
investigatory powers. For instance, in the US, the leading example of a common law 
scheme, the enforcement agencies, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice, cannot block anticompetitive conduct by themselves, but likewise to private 
plaintiffs have to litigate all cases before the courts. However, more than 90% of all 
formal US antitrust actions are brought to the courts by private litigators (Kemper, 2004: 
9; Wils, 2003: 477). The strong role of private enforcement in antitrust prosecution is due 
to a range of systemic features in the US model that make it particularly attractive to 
initiate legal proceedings against corporations, such as damage compensation, class 
actions, contingency fees, criminal prosecution and leniency schemes: A successful 
plaintiff in the US can be awarded not only the costs of suing (expert fees and attorney’s 
fees), but up to three-times the damage suffered (treble damages). Moreover, plaintiffs 
can group together and sue collectively (class actions) and professional litigators may 
offer contingency fees or sell their legal services under a “no-cure-no-pay” condition. In 
combination with criminal sanctions (imprisonment of CEOs), and leniency schemes 
(immunity from prosecution to those who first confess having participated in a collusive 
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agreement), there is much incentive to bring antitrust infringements to the US courts. 
Consequently, the regulation of business conduct relies significantly on an ex post 
enforcement by private plaintiffs, rendering the U.S. common law tradition a market-
oriented model with “private attorney generals.” The basic objectives of competition 
policy and the mode of enforcement are closely intertwined. Both parts of the LME 
model rely on the critical notion that public market intervention should be kept as limited 
as possible. Moreover, both assume that collusive behavior should be prosecuted merely 
on the basis that other market actors have clearly been negatively affected. The focus on 
only one decisional criterion upon which anticompetitive conduct is judged necessarily 
follows from the litigation-oriented approach – otherwise the discretionary power of the 
courts would be too excessive. There is no place for long-term concerns, neither in policy 
paradigms, nor during their enforcement through private litigants that are primarily 
motivated by short-term profits. 
 
In Continental Europe the civil law tradition is more prominent. Although judicial 
precedence does play some role in the interpretation of competition laws, enforcement is 
merely a “clause-centric” approach (Hwang, 2004: 114), bound to general and abstract 
legislation, complemented by more detailed regulatory frameworks. In civil law 
countries, specialized competition authorities, rather than courts, are the main decision-
makers – a model that has been termed the “integrated agency model” (cf. Trebilcock and 
Iacobucci, 2002), or the administrative control model. Competition authorities tend to be 
equipped with far-reaching discretionary powers when addressing and administering 
anticompetitive business conduct. Regimes of ex ante authorization according to which 
corporate actors notify planned agreements to competition authorities are common not 
only for mergers, but also for commercial agreements. Due to the bureaucratic character, 
ex post enforcement by courts and private litigants is far less important. Courts are 
merely involved in case corporate actors appeal against the decisions taken by 
competition authorities. Again, competition policy principles and the mode of their 
enforcement are closely interrelated with the basic institutions of CME-type economies 
The ordo-liberal legacy of “comprehensive” competition control is reflected in the 
institutionalization of powerful public enforcement agencies with wide-ranging 
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competencies, allowing for the “ordering” of the economy according to a broader 
political view. Only public agencies can be entrusted to balance the multiple goals of 
antitrust policies within the CME model, including the promotion of the transfer of 
innovations by inter-firm collaboration. 
 
Against this background, the 2004 reform of EU antitrust regulation and enforcement is 
the most radical shift in the history of European competition policy. It came in the form 
of a package of both substantial and procedural changes. One of the core components 
consists of replacing the more than 40 year-old Regulation 17/62 with Regulation 1/2003. 
This measure abolished the long-standing administrative notification regime under which 
companies could have ensured in advance by the European Commission that a planned 
commercial agreement did not fall into the category of a cartel or other restrictive 
business practices prohibited under Article 81 (TEC). As the business community cannot 
rely anymore on the sanction-free notification procedure, but has to assess by itself 
whether a planned deal infringes with the law or not, the main burden of antitrust 
enforcement has now been shifted to the private sector. Companies are not only expected 
to ‘police’ themselves, but also their competitors, distributors and suppliers by bringing 
infringements of Article 81 to the courts, usually based on the expert advice by 
transnational law firms. Thus, the new regime introduces greater reliance on private 
‘market intelligence’ in spotting anti-competitive practices and less market supervision 
and intervention by public authorities. This constitutes a considerable step of 
convergence towards the US model, which for commercial agreements never had a 
similar notification regime in place. Although the reform does not (yet) touch upon 
national enforcement practices, the conversion towards the Anglo-Saxon common law 
competition enforcement model is likely to be driven a step further by the introduction of 
stronger incentives for private plaintiffs to litigate. Commissioner Kroes is quite overt in 
this respect by stating that “[…] the comprehensive enforcement of the competition rules 
is not yet complete – not enough use is made of the courts.” (Kroes, 2005). Hence, the 
decision for increased private enforcement is likely to paving the way for further legal 
modifications on the national level, such as the introduction of an explicit system of 
damage relief for private plaintiffs, leniency schemes, and the possibility for class 
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actions. The Commission believes that once a system of damage relief is introduced also 
on the Member State level, private parties will go much further in bringing actions to the 
courts than competition authorities (Monti, 2004). Although private plaintiffs have 
neither invaded the European nor the national courts with legal actions in competition 
matters since Regulation 1/2003 has come into effect, it is likely to open up a Pandora’s 
Box of further legal modifications that bring the European (CME) model of competition 
law enforcement one crucial step closer to the US-style (LME) competition culture.  
 
Finally, the sweeping reform in one of the core pillars of European competition control 
not only contains a shift in the mode of regulation (from public to private enforcement), 
but also in the substance of regulation (from ordo-liberalism to the Chicago School). By 
facilitating private litigation, much more importance is now given to short-term consumer 
welfare considerations, which underpins the application of a single measure for 
anticompetitive conduct that can be entrusted to courts and private litigants. The move 
away from the public multi-goal perspective towards the narrow efficiency concern 
radically breaks with the European tradition of pursuing broader goals in competition law 
enforcement (e.g. the protection of competitors from the concentrated power of dominant 
companies, or the safeguarding of innovation transfer by inter-company agreements). The 
2004 competition reform entails a shift away from the previous administrative and 
legalistic approach towards increased use of economic reasoning as a focal point for 
decision-making, which constitutes another crucial point of convergence towards the 
Chicago model (cf. Hwang, 2004). Increasingly, rigorous economic analyses underpin the 
assessments of restrictive business practices (e.g. extensive empirical and econometric 
assessments on product markets and market shares, simulation models and price 
calculations, damage analyses).  In combination with private self-enforcement and 
facilitated court access, however, large parts of the burden of judging anti-competitive 
conduct on the basis of economic evidence will have to be carried by private companies, 
in particular specialized transnational law firms of Anglo-Saxon origin. 
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Conclusion: Coordination Service Firms and the Battle of Capitalisms in the 
European Union 
In sum, we can observe that institutions that are strongly interlinked with the LME model 
are being transplanted into CME- type economies by the means of transnational private 
governance, particularly within the European Union. Examples include accounting 
standards, rating agencies and competition policy enforcement by law firms. Together, 
these recent activities tend to strongly undermine the institutional complementarities 
inherent in CMEs.  
 
The privatization of certain facets of EU business regulation has gained ground through a 
depoliticized, professions-based interest constellation that disregards more eminent 
political features of this form of economic organization (Dewing and Russell, 2004: 300). 
It should not surprise that attempts by the EU to introduce Anglo-Saxon standards in the 
form of public regulations, such as the European Works Council Directive, the European 
Company Statute Directive and the 13th Takeover Directive, have led to somewhat 
uneasy compromises, given the high visibility of these issues and the corresponding 
political controversy (Cernat, 2004). In contrast, the private-authority based regulations 
discussed in this article have led to a clear decision in favour of the Anglo-Saxon model. 
While more explicit political attacks on the basic institutions of Rhenish capitalism are 
not (yet) feasible, the enhanced role of private actors in EU regulation provides an 
excellent opportunity for the erosion of these institutions – “through the backdoor.”  
 
Seen in perspective, we thus link content and mode of governance, since its private 
transnational character has made the mobilization of a meaningful opposition by labor, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises or representations of the Rhenish variety of 
capitalism as a whole far more difficult. Particularly from the perspective of international 
organizations such as the European Commission, regulation via transnational private 
governance may thus be an attractive option to circumvent a political opposition that 
would be more powerful in case of public inter-governmental regulation. 
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